Zamp and the question of the moment: is it possible to revive weakened brands?
With Starbucks and Subway growing again two years after the judicial reorganization, the question arises of how much of this turnaround Zamp has already completed and what still depends on execution
By Leonardo Shinohara (junior at GNPoli)
On October 31, 2023, SouthRock, then the operator of Starbucks and Subway in Brazil, filed for judicial reorganization. The group cited economic instability, interest rate volatility and exchange rate fluctuations to explain the deterioration of its finances, but the practical effect was already visible on the ground. Starbucks had 187 stores in the country and began closing units due to late rent payments, as there was not enough cash to honor contracts and inventory was not arriving. Thus, the brand that had established itself in Brazil as a symbol of urban consumption entered a new phase. Subway, in turn, faced a problem of a different nature, since it was operated entirely by franchisees. The chain ended 2023 with SSS (same-store sales) close to zero and a system disconnected from the master franchisor, the company that held the right to operate the brand in the country.
This is the state in which Zamp found the two assets. The former BK Brasil, which already operated Burger King and Popeyes under a franchise agreement with Restaurant Brands International (RBI), completed the acquisition of Starbucks and took over the Subway master franchise in October 2024. The price paid reflects well what was bought, as the company paid R$102 million for an operation that came with fewer stores, uncovered inventory and debt to inherit. Of the 187 original units, only 114 entered the portfolio. In addition, in September 2025, Mubadala Capital, the arm of Abu Dhabi's sovereign wealth fund, acquired 85% of the company, giving it a long-term shareholder to fund the rebuilding.
In light of this, the management led by Pedro Zemel since April 2025 concluded that the core problem lay in the in-store experience. Instead of pursuing margin through cost cutting, Zamp decided to spend precisely on the points the customer notices. The most illustrative test took place in about 30 Burger King restaurants in the North Zone of São Paulo, where the company increased the number of employees per shift and equipment maintenance, in addition to carrying out small renovations and training. As a result, these stores began to grow 25% above the chain's average. The method is not financial but operational, and it is what explains what has happened to the four brands since then.
At Starbucks, the work started with the basics, since before touching the product it was necessary to normalize inventories, recover the stores and restore service levels. Only then came the menu overhaul, with the Brazilian Coffees line, in a deliberate effort to bring the brand closer to Brazilian consumption habits. In this way, the operation that delivered SSS (same store sales) of -16.8% in 2024 started to grow and has not stopped since, posting six consecutive quarters of growth since Zamp took over. This movement separates recovery from expansion, as the brand still has practically the same number of stores it received. Thus, Zamp consolidates a model that optimizes sales in existing stores and strengthens the foundation of the business.
At Subway, the work was of a different nature, since the brand is fully franchised in Brazil. Same-store sales went from close to zero to 19% in 2Q26. However, the figure that best captures the turnaround is not sales but open doors. In 2025, the chain shrank significantly, with 108 closures over the year, in a deliberate clean-up of the base. But in 2026 the signal reversed and openings began to outnumber closures, so that the chain returned to growth and ended June with 1,466 restaurants.
Meanwhile, the two brands Zamp already knew sustained the operation and financed the turnaround. Burger King ended 2Q26 with 986 restaurants, SSS (same store sales) of 5.2% and a gross margin of 68.2%, the result of the revenue management strategy adopted to absorb protein inflation. Popeyes, in turn, grew 15.6% in same-store sales, reached 96 units and resumed store openings in 2025, after a year focused on maturing the existing operation.
The combined effect shows up in the consolidated figures. Gross margin reached 69.3% in 2Q26, the highest in the company's history, driven by the pricing strategy and by the larger share of revenue from Subway services. In addition, adjusted EBITDA totaled R$185 million in the quarter and the net loss narrowed to R$45.8 million. The operation also generated cash: R$254 million in the quarter, 23% higher than a year earlier.
Therefore, the discussion is no longer about the turnaround but about the next stage. Zamp invested R$242 million in the first half, more than double the same period of 2025, mostly in reinvestment in stores, renovations, technology and openings. In addition, the 2026 plan calls for around 70 company-owned store openings and 200 Burger King renovations. But this money has a different return profile from what has been spent so far. The store-opening process has a lagged effect, which concentrates the financial return from 2026 openings in 2027.
In a scenario where investment comes ahead of immediate results, Zamp proves that it is possible to revive weakened brands. Starbucks is selling more with the same store base, Subway is opening stores again, Burger King has rebuilt its margin and Popeyes has resumed expansion, all in less than two years. The next stage is one of consolidation and execution, so the relevant question going forward is no longer whether Zamp knows how to fix things, but how fast it knows how to grow.
